The High North Strategy: A New Framework for U.S. Security in Greenland

By Atlantic Council Editorial Staff
May 13, 2026

As the geopolitical center of gravity shifts toward the Arctic, the United States finds itself at a critical juncture regarding its presence in Greenland. A semi-autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has emerged as a focal point for modern homeland defense, satellite surveillance, and the global competition for critical minerals. In response to these evolving realities, the Atlantic Council Task Force on Greenland has released a comprehensive strategy paper advocating for a "Defend, Deny, Deepen, and Develop" framework to secure U.S. and allied interests in the High North.

Main Facts: The Strategic Pivot

The Arctic region, long treated as a peripheral theater of global affairs, is increasingly contested. Russia has aggressively refurbished its Soviet-era military infrastructure along its northern coastline, while China—despite lacking sovereign Arctic territory—has branded itself a "near-Arctic state," utilizing dual-use research vessels and investment overtures to gain a foothold in the region.

For the United States, Greenland represents the "key terrain" of the North Atlantic. Its geographic position along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap is indispensable for monitoring maritime threats, including nuclear-armed submarines, and for hosting early-warning radar systems vital to detecting ballistic missile threats to the continental United States. Furthermore, the island serves as a prime location for space domain awareness and satellite downlink capabilities, which are essential for modern military operations.

Chronology of Tensions and Reconciliation

The relationship between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk has undergone significant turbulence in early 2026.

A US and allied strategy for Greenland
  • January 2026: Tensions escalated sharply when President Donald Trump publicly declared an interest in the United States "owning" the island. The rhetoric triggered diplomatic friction with European allies and prompted several nations, including France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, to bolster their military presence in the Arctic in a show of solidarity with Denmark.
  • January 2026 (Davos): Following a period of heightened uncertainty, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte intervened at the World Economic Forum, facilitating a diplomatic breakthrough. President Trump subsequently announced a new framework for a cooperative deal.
  • March 2026: The U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to pursue increased access to three specific sites in Greenland, marking the first tangible step toward operationalizing the new strategic framework.
  • Mid-2026: Negotiators from the United States and Denmark continue to refine the details of the post-Davos framework, aiming to formalize long-term defense cooperation.

Supporting Data: The Economic and Security Landscape

The task force highlights that while kinetic military threats remain currently low, the risk of "hybrid" interference is rising. China’s "Polar Silk Road" initiative seeks to leverage economic investment to gain political influence, though these efforts have largely failed to materialize into significant projects due to stringent screening by Denmark and Greenland.

The economic reality of the region remains complex. While Greenland holds vast, untapped deposits of rare earth elements and critical minerals—essential for industries ranging from artificial intelligence to aerospace—the cost of extraction is prohibitive. The harsh climate and lack of basic infrastructure (ports, roads, and energy grids) mean that large-scale commercial mining is not yet self-sustaining.

Currently, the U.S. footprint is limited to roughly two hundred personnel at the Pituffik Space Base. The strategy paper notes that while Russia has engaged in at least a dozen provocative military actions near Alaska in the last five years, it has maintained a more cautious approach toward Greenland, largely due to the island’s deep integration into NATO’s security architecture.

Official Responses and Strategic Pillars

The proposed strategy aligns with the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which prioritize homeland defense and the strengthening of allied burden-sharing. The "Defend, Deny, Deepen, and Develop" framework is built upon four pillars:

1. Defend the Homeland

To ensure the U.S. remains safe, the strategy calls for giving the Arctic a formal strategic mandate in all defense planning. This includes:

A US and allied strategy for Greenland
  • Leveraging the 1951 Defense Agreement: Utilizing existing legal authority to modernize infrastructure at former defense sites.
  • Arctic Training: Expanding the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska and linking exercises like "Arctic Edge" with European theater drills like "Nordic Response."
  • Diplomatic Representation: Filling the vacant ambassador-at-large position for Arctic affairs to provide a centralized point of contact for diplomatic and investment inquiries.

2. Deny Adversary Dominance

Preventing Russia and China from gaining control over critical resources is paramount. The task force recommends:

  • Investment Screening: Strengthening laws across Arctic nations to prevent malign economic activity.
  • NORAD Modernization: Updating sensors to detect threats, ensuring that incidents like the 2023 Chinese balloon incursion are not repeated.
  • Public Attribution: Washington should adopt a policy of publicly calling out adversarial violations of sovereign territory to reinforce deterrence.

3. Deepen Allied Burden-Sharing

The United States cannot secure the Arctic alone. The strategy envisions NATO as the primary forum for these efforts:

  • Arctic Sentry: Formalizing this initiative as a recurring, multidomain NATO activity focused on the GIUK Gap.
  • Host Nation Support (HNS): Encouraging Denmark to provide additional HNS, which would count toward their 5 percent of GDP defense spending target, effectively shifting some of the financial burden from U.S. taxpayers.
  • Partnerships: Engaging non-NATO allies like Japan and South Korea on economic and scientific fronts to create a broad coalition of like-minded states.

4. Develop Economic Potential

To offer an alternative to Chinese investment, the U.S. must lower the barrier to entry for private capital.

  • Defense Production Act (DPA): Designating Greenland as a "domestic source of supply" under Title III of the DPA would allow U.S. firms to access loans and guarantees, de-risking mining projects.
  • Collaborative Financing: Partnering the U.S. Development Finance Corporation with Danish institutions to fund infrastructure, ensuring that development is both profitable and strategically secure.

Implications: The Path to Future Sovereignty

The question of Greenlandic independence remains a long-term factor in the regional equation. While a majority of Greenlanders support eventual independence from Denmark, the process is inherently complex, requiring extensive negotiations regarding defense, foreign policy, and citizenship.

The Atlantic Council task force emphasizes that the United States must position itself as a "partner of choice." By fostering prosperity and security, Washington can ensure that regardless of the constitutional status of the island, Greenland remains a cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance.

A US and allied strategy for Greenland

The risks, however, are not insignificant. The strategy assumes that current political stability within the Kingdom of Denmark remains intact and that environmental and political opposition to mining in Greenland can be managed through transparent, sustainable development practices. Failure to address these concerns could lead to local backlash, potentially driving Nuuk toward alternative, non-Western partners.

Conclusion

The path forward for Greenland is no longer merely a regional concern but a global strategic necessity. Through a robust, multi-layered approach that integrates military deterrence with economic investment, the United States and its allies can ensure that the Arctic remains a space of stability rather than conflict. As the Arctic ice continues to recede, the "Defend, Deny, Deepen, and Develop" framework provides the necessary roadmap to navigate the challenges of the coming decades, ensuring that the United States remains safer, stronger, and more prosperous in an era of renewed great-power competition.

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